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Travelling in The Secular 
WaSTe land
de certeau and the irruptions of the Mystical
Jefferson M. Chua
In this decayed hole among the mountains
In the faint moonlight, the grass is singing
Over the tumbled graves, about the chapel
There is an empty chapel, only the wind’s home.
- T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land1
i. introduction
Charles Taylor offers a somber sketch of our present spiritual and religious situation: “one is either thoroughly in this world, living by its premises, and then one cannot really believe in 
God; or one believes, and is in some sense living like a resident alien 
in modernity. Since we find ourselves more and more inducted into 
it, belief becomes harder and harder; the horizon of faith steadily 
recedes.”2 He points out that man’s frames of knowing are altered at 
the dawn of modernity, closing off any relation or openness to the 
1T. S. Eliot, “The Waste Land,” in Frank Kermode, ed., The Waste Land and 
Other Poems (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), 68.
2Charles Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” in Mark A. Wrathall, ed., Religion 
After Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58.
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transcendent. This delimits the reach of the human experience and 
orients it to a naturalistic frame. It is in this closure that Taylor locates 
what he will call the secular age: an age of loss and exile precisely 
because belief in the transcendent becomes unthinkable (or at the 
very least difficult to achieve) and what replaces it is a plurality of the 
modalities of human flourishing.
We also see a multiplication of different modalities of religious 
bel ief and practice—what Taylor cal ls a “nova effect”3—as 
characteristic of this situation. One sees this nova effect in phenomena 
as diverse as new-age spiritualisms and the resurgence of religious 
fundamentalism in various parts of the world to the rise of secular 
humanism and militant atheism. In the wake of this plurality of views, 
Taylor nevertheless proposes that the challenge of this age, despite the 
unthinkability of belief, is the need “to enlarge our palette of such 
points of contact with fullness.”4 In an illuminating study on the 16th 
and 17th century mystics, Michel de Certeau presents a possible point 
of departure: “[Mystical discourse] suggests a way of entering those 
ageing texts and surveying the movement of their modes of writing 
against the background of today’s issues.”5 In an attempt to provide 
a cogent response to Taylor’s challenge, we can ask: how can mystical 
discourse and its textualities provide us a mode of dwelling in the 
so-called secular age?
Attempting to answer this question requires two steps. First, 
we shall be mapping out the conditions of belief and unbelief that 
Taylor elaborates, specifically with regard to the diversification of the 
varieties of human fullness, i.e., the proliferation of different ideas 
of “the good life” after the modern turn towards naturalism and the 
3Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 66.
4Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 729.
5Michel de Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” in Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 81.
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moral subject.6 This will set up what Taylor will call “the nova effect” 
and will give us a picture of the state of contemporary religious belief, 
which in turn will lead us to the second step: the place of the mystics 
in contemporary religious discourse. We shall be utilizing Michel de 
Certeau’s analysis of mystic speech and writing in uncovering certain 
themes—specifically, narratives of exile and excess—that can serve 
as signposts in reclaiming a sense of spirituality in a time of crisis, as 
the mystics did in their “dark nights.” Elaborating on the mystics will 
hopefully provide a response to Taylor’s challenge to “enlarge our 
palette on such points on human fullness” and point to the possibility 
of reclaiming a place that, at the “twilight of the idols,” has become 
vacuous and deserted. What is at stake, in the final analysis, is a new 
possibility of dwelling in an age of loss.
ii. a Spiritual crisis?
Nietzsche paints a picture of the state of contemporary religious 
belief in The Madman:
Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the 
breadth of empty space? … Do we not hear anything yet of the noise 
of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything 
yet of God’s decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers 
of all murderers, comfort ourselves?7
Nietzsche’s madman, we are led to see, leaves as he says, “This deed 
is still more distant from them than the most distant stars—and yet 
they have done it themselves.”8 Robert Pippin notes that this parable (if 
one were to call it one) “has come to represent and sum up not just 
6Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 52.
7Friedrich Nietzsche, selections from “The Gay Science,” in The Portable 
Nietzsche, ed. & trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 
1982), 95.
8Nietzsche, selections from “The Gay Science,” in The Portable Nietzsche, 96.
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the unbelievability of God in the late modern world, but the ‘death’ of 
a Judeo-Christian form of moral life, the end of metaphysics, or the 
unsuccessful attempt to end metaphysics, or even the end of philosophy 
itself.”9 Despite the plurality of interpretations that abound from 
Nietzsche’s account, it cannot be denied that he speaks of a particular 
form of life that has become difficult to attain: that of a religious life. 
The contemporary age, at least most prevalent in the so-called Western 
world, can be characterized by a certain degree of impossibility in 
sustaining religious belief or, at the very least, a suspicion in the belief 
in what is usually referred to as “God.” What is striking in Nietzsche 
is that he puts the blame on humanity for this “death of God.” This 
does not mean, however, that humanity was directly responsible 
for “murdering” God; what is suggested is simply the fact that the 
human person and his or her way of living had something to do with 
the gradual withering away of our traditional conceptions of God.
Far from the usual narratives of the triumph of science over religion, 
or of the success of reason over myth and superstition, what we are 
confronted with in our contemporary age is a change in the conditions of 
belief and unbelief such that these conditions have made religious belief 
increasingly difficult, and in some places, even impossible. It is this 
alteration of the conditions of belief and unbelief that allows us to 
call our age, even if only provisionally, a spiritual crisis: a moment of 
decision (krinein) that becomes available because a plurality of choices 
has been made apparent due to the change in conditions.10
9Robert Pippin, “Love and Death in Nietzsche,” in Mark Wrathall, ed., Religion 
After Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7.
10As Taylor would note later, this crisis has taken on different forms, most 
especially of what others would call a “return of the religious.” Such a rise in 
the apparent plurality of religious worldviews refutes, at least for Taylor, the 
thesis that increasing secularization has led to a more marginal sense of belief 
which will eventually lead to its own demise. He even points out that this age 
is dominated by a concern for “spiritual wholeness” which makes manifest 
the change in the conditions of belief and unbelief. See Taylor, A Secular 
Age, 506–507.
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How did the human condition come to this? What shifts in 
the history of thought brought about this crisis? Charles Taylor, in 
his landmark book A Secular Age, offers a redefinition of what is 
traditionally called “secularism”:
the change I want to define and trace is one which takes us from a 
society in which it is virtually impossible not to believe in God, to 
one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human 
possibility among others. … Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. 
There are alternatives.11
This redefinition is striking since it shows us 1) the socio-political 
context in which belief and the activity of believing in God are situated 
in, and 2) how such a belief (or lack thereof) involves some degree of 
human agency, i.e., one chooses to believe such-and-such. This modality 
of secularism is helpful for our goal in this essay since Taylor shows 
a genealogy of the concept of religious belief, and the conditions of 
the permissibility and impermissibility of such a belief. In short, the 
contemporary crisis reveals a history of confluences that leads to what 
we are confronting now.
Something peculiar happens in modernity. For Taylor:
[The] new creation of a civilized, “polite” order succeeded beyond 
what its first originators could have hoped for, and [this] in turn led to 
a new reading of what a Christian order might be, one which was seen 
more and more in “immanent” terms (the polite, civilized order is the 
Christian order). This version of Christianity was shorn of much of 
its “transcendent” content, and was thus open to a new departure, in 
which the understanding of the good order (what I call the “modern 
moral order”) could be embraced outside of the original theological, 
providential framework, and in certain cases even against it (as with 
Voltaire, Gibbon, and in another way Hume).12
Modernity marks the era wherein the unchallenged claims to moral 
and spiritual order by Christendom are faced with the relatively new 
entry of the discourse of self-sufficient humanism, which for Taylor 
11Taylor, A Secular Age, 3.
12Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 63.
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refers to a mode of humanism that accepts “no final goals beyond 
goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else 
beyond this flourishing.”13 He argues that the rise of science at the 
turn of modernity paved the way for a more radical and fundamental 
shift in the human being’s mode of comportment with the world: 
“the power of materialism today does not come from the scientific 
‘facts,’ but has rather to be explained in terms of the power of a certain 
package uniting materialism with a moral outlook [my italics], the package 
we could call ‘atheist humanism,’ or exclusive humanism.”14 More 
than merely the rise of science and the age of discovery, we also see 
in modernity the fusion of the horizon of the purely materialist and 
naturalist account of the world with that of the question of “the good 
life.” As we shall see later, any inquiry into the good life—at the height 
of modernity—cannot but exclude God from the picture.
Taylor traces this fusion in the gradual formation of a robust ideal 
of a human being capable of his or her own actions and, consequently, 
the “hardening” of this capability not only to be the author of one’s 
own actions but also to regard the world according to this capability. 
In short, we see the “human” taking center stage—a fixed reference 
point not only for the intelligibility of the world but also for the 
meaningfulness of the human being’s place in this order. But this state 
of affairs was not always the case. For Taylor, this relatively modern 
invention was a far cry from what was traditionally considered to be 
the status quo in the order of the cosmos. One could say that before 
the modern turn, God’s activity in the world was implicated in the 
numerous human dealings and structures that made up society, not to 
13Taylor, A Secular Age, 18. It must be clear that Taylor himself considers other 
approaches to understanding this phenomenon in modernity, such as the rise of 
science and the scientific mindset, but he considers these approaches inadequate 
for the purpose at hand, which is to describe how the conditions of belief changed 
from one of naïve acceptance of a theistic interpretation of the world order to 
one of doubt because of the existence of viable and rational alternatives. These 
alternatives might include the scientific mindset, but they are in no way constitutive 
of these mindsets. See Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 54–56.
14Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 58.
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mention becoming a reference point in the whole order of the cosmos.15 
A reference to God made up the architecture of the cosmos; the natural 
world was a creation of a benevolent Being, and the human being had 
to find her place, so to speak, in this order.16 It is thus tempting to 
think that the transition from pre-modern and medieval societies to 
modern ones concerned itself with a gradual suspicion and decline of 
the involvement of God with the dealings of humanity. But as Taylor 
points out, this perceived “subtraction theory” is far too simple a 
schema that uncritically pits humanism against theism:
That I am left with only human concerns doesn’t tell me to take 
universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that freedom 
is important, or fulfillment, or equality. Just being confined to human 
goods could just as well find expression in my concerning myself 
exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of my family or 
immediate milieu.17
The fusion of the materialistic world view with that of the question of 
the moral order is meant to show precisely this: that the bifurcation 
between modern “enlightenment” and “traditional” religious beliefs 
becomes an inadequate tool in understanding how exactly we ended 
up with our contemporary age. For Taylor, placing the “human” as the 
central reference point does not at all mean that old regimes of religious 
belief are now invalidated; on the contrary, it becomes the point of 
departure—a necessary postulate, if you will—in understanding how 
exactly the conditions of belief get reconfigured in the modern age. 
One cannot understand the so-called “secular age” without inquiring 
about the role played by human agency.
Despite the relatively modern invention of what we can call the 
“hard conception” of human agency (authorship of actions), we find 
traces of it, surprisingly, in religion and religious practice. Ruth Abbey 
15Taylor, A Secular Age, 25.
16Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 125.
17Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 61.
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links Taylor’s insights in Sources of the Self with his work on secularism 
and points out that the gradual insulation of the self from the perceived 
“outside world” can be traced to techniques of self-control that were 
proliferated by neo-Stoics such as Justus Lipsius.18 Abbey continues: 
“In order for humans to be sole guarantors of order and good conduct 
in the world, they needed not just a view of their technical capacity 
to change themselves and their world, but also an argument about 
motivation.”19 Practices of self-control and inwardness proliferated in 
the centuries leading up to the modern age: Taylor points to, among 
others, Meister Eckhart and Thomas Kempis as having emphasized 
the value of inward life and private prayer for cultivating one’s personal 
faith.20 These moves towards the inward life can be said to be, as Taylor 
points out, an attempt to “make the faith relevant,” so to speak, as the 
gap between the elites and the masses was becoming more and more 
incommensurable (it was not a surprise that most clergymen were elites 
during that time).21 The explicitly religious motivations of the turn 
towards an inner life (as distinguished from inwardness, as I will clarify 
later), among a host of other reasons22 such as the various injustices 
committed on the part of the Church hierarchy, provided the necessary 
fodder for a much-later development that would shake up the Latin 
Church: the Reformation. To be sure, those who advocated the inner 
life surely did not have a total re-ordering of the whole Latin Church 
in their minds; but the public nature of these developments—how 
18Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
206. To be sure, such an interpretation cannot be taken to be definitive of the 
entire Latin Christian tradition. One has to point out that this is one of many 
(probably disjointed and unrelated, but nonetheless important) developments 
in early Christianity in regard to which Taylor will talk about the self later on.
19Abbey, Charles Taylor, 207.
20Taylor, A Secular Age, 70.
21Taylor, A Secular Age, 70.
22Interestingly, Taylor also points out that the “enchanted” worldview and the 
subsequent attempt by the Church to capitalize on this enchantment also led to the 
Reformation. For a summary of his views, see Taylor, A Secular Age, 75–76.
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the disenchantment was made more apparent in the attempt by the 
Church to suppress them—led to a multiplication and the eventual 
homogenization of the concept of the believer.23 This uniformity—that 
anyone can attain the inwardness of a religious life—sets the stage for 
what Taylor calls a “buffered self” that will eventually develop into 
the Cartesian vision of the cogito reaching out to the res extensa, which 
will animate much of Western modernity and set its language—one 
of subjectivity and agency.24
I have used inwardness in contrast with the inner life. What merits 
us this distinction? A detailed explanation of “the inner life” will 
come much later, but for now, inwardness can be taken to mean not 
just an introspection but also—as we have alluded to earlier through 
Abbey—an attempt at articulating a motivation for such a move: one 
can legitimize one’s move precisely because the resources of such a 
move are not found “outside me” but are present within me as my 
inherent capabilities. And so the story goes for religious belief: at the 
turn of modernity, one “discovers” these inherent capabilities—
one can choose to believe such-and-such. But this is not mere 
anthropomorphism; for Taylor, this phenomenon is closely tied—as 
with the Reform spirit—with the rise of the belief that one is entitled 
to inwardness and selfhood that is given by God:
Disbelief in God arises in close symbiosis with this belief in a moral 
order of rights-bearing individuals, who are destined (by God or 
Nature) to act for mutual benefit; an order which thus rejects the earlier 
honor ethic which exalted the warrior, as it also tends to occlude any 
transcendent horizon.25
So what we have is not really an invalidation of the belief in God; 
what we have is a more complex and nuanced web of relations and 
23Taylor, A Secular Age, 77.
24Taylor, Sources of the Self, 143.
25Taylor, “Closed World Structures,” 63. Taylor sees this as the point of 
departure for many deist theories where God gradually assumes an impersonal 
and indifferent persona, and the universe becomes an order made by God that 
is waiting to be discovered.
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motivations that provides the tools for one to think that religious belief 
is one choice among other choices. God still figures in one’s life but it 
sets in motion the gradual decentering of God and the replacement of 
the “human” at the center of all reference. This decentering of God did 
not mean the retreat of God from the public sphere; what we have is 
God’s marginalization in the face of a new “center”: man and his or her 
relation with the impersonal order of the universe. This, most precisely, 
is the progenitor of exclusive humanism. Moreover, it also reveals a 
fundamental difference with that of the old world order of enchantment 
and cosmic order: the closure of the transcendent horizon.
Here we come full circle: why exactly does the transcendent 
horizon close up? Or, we can ask: how does it occur that the move 
towards inwardness in turn closes off the horizon of the transcendent? 
We turn to the fusion of naturalistic-materialist thinking and the vision 
of the good. If before it was a matter of “finding oneself” amidst the 
order of the cosmos, we now experience a reversal: the order of the 
cosmos is dependent upon my agency, because to exercise my agency is 
part of the blueprint of Nature. In other words, the vision of the good 
coincides and fuses with the naturalist (that is to say, indifferent) picture 
of the cosmos. One has no need for “vertical” transcendence because 
the good is to be found in what can be experienced in nature and in 
the immanent world. Thus, we see how the transcendent is closed off 
with the shift of focus towards the autonomous individual, away from 
the idea that the “good” can be contemplated as an intimation between 
the human being and the cosmos.26 These models of inwardness and 
self-legislature were to become the paradigms of thought that translated 
themselves in terms of social transactions and architectures: “The fact 
that both society and politics came to be seen as self-grounding and 
self-reproducing points to yet another way in which what was once 
transcendent—the source of social order—became immanent and 
26Rémi Brague, The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in 
Western Thought, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), 152.
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secularity became further entrenched.”27 It is in this multiplication of 
immanent frames that the agent now finds herself or himself. From 
the untenable position of unbelief in the medieval times, we see a shift 
in the conditions of belief and unbelief: the pluralities of individual 
human flourishing.
And thus we get a picture of the contemporary age: an age where 
there is a manifold of possibilities for thinking about—and acting 
on—the good life. Taylor, as we have seen, locates this pluralized vision 
of the good in the transformation of the modern moral subject as the 
author of his or her own actions. We have also seen that it is in this 
transformation that the transcendent horizon— a “vertical conception” 
of the good life—gradually becomes more and more difficult to sustain. 
This is not to say that religious belief is on the decline; on the contrary, 
a buffet of “contacts with the transcendent” abound, as evidenced by 
what various scholars refer to as the phenomenon of the “return of 
the religious.”28 But what is telling here, Taylor argues, is that these 
varieties are grounded on human concerns and human aspirations, thus 
producing the illusion of reaching out to this transcendent: from new-
age spiritualisms to the oft-used label of “spiritual but not religious,” 
this illustrates what Taylor calls “the nova effect”:
Then there came … within the context of the modern moral order 
… a viable alternative to belief, of forms of exclusive humanism, in 
turn followed by a multiplication of both believing and unbelieving 
positions …. This all generated the challenge, undermining, and 
dissolution of the early social forms which embedded God’s presence 
in social space.29
27Abbey, Charles Taylor, 208.
28Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at 
the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Jacques Derrida & Gianni Vattimo, eds., Religion, 
trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 42.
29Taylor, A Secular Age, 531. He also discusses the epistemic roots of this frame 
in the latter chapters of A Secular Age:
What we share is what I have been calling “the immanent frame”; the 
different structures we live in: scientific, social, technological, and 
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What is apparent in this nova effect is the lingering doubt that abounds, 
even for the staunchest believer—more than due to the plurification of 
choices which makes it possible to think of an “otherwise,” we also see 
that a suspicion of traditional confessional religious belonging abounds 
simply because the social space where that belief is practiced no longer 
holds as much legitimacy as before. To believe in God is not the only 
option available, thus reconfiguring the space for belief.30
Despite this, Taylor also sees a positive import in this phenomenon:
The very fact that its forms are not absolutely in tune with much of 
the spirit of our age; a spirit in which people can be imprisoned, and 
feel the need to break out; the fact that faith connects us to so many 
spiritual avenues across different ages; this can over time draw people 
towards it.31
The argument here is that one does not need to “recover” the 
conditions of belief and unbelief before the modern transformation 
(the delineation was not that clean, anyway), but whether, in this age 
of crisis, a path may be taken that “enlarges our palette” with contacts 
of fullness, that is to say, human fullness and fulfillment that do not 
depend solely on individual human flourishing. What is at stake here is 
the possibility of choosing to open up to the transcendent in the midst 
of the secular waste land, which in the final analysis is a “return” to 
the religious, but a return, in the words of T. S. Eliot, to “where we 
started / And know the place for the first time.”32
so on, constitute such a frame in that they are part of a “natural”, or 
“this-worldly” order which can be understood in its own terms, without 
reference to the “supernatural” or “transcendent.” (594)
30Taylor, A Secular Age, 531.
31Taylor, A Secular Age, 533.
32T. S. Eliot, “Four Quartets,” http://www.coldbacon.com/poems/fq.html 
(accessed March 18, 2014).
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 iii. retrieving the Mystical: 
The locus of language
Notwithstanding the increasing interest in mystical literature 
and what is commonly called “mysticism”, one should be careful in 
proceeding with a study on the mystics, let alone what constitutes as 
“mystical experience,” if ever it can even be studied in its phenomenality. 
We can ask: what exactly constitutes the “mystical”? Jean-Luc Marion 
notes that the term, “especially in the academic domain where 
rationalism seems to encompass every possible form of rationality,” has 
been identified as either a purely subjective supra-essential experience, 
or as a term that escapes any kind of scientific rigor.33 One can even 
accede to the fact that the term “mystic” has acquired a pejorative 
sense, becoming a euphemism for what is generally referred to as 
“crazy.” For instance, in his Through a Glass Darkly, Ingmar Bergman 
paints a very vivid picture of this perception with Karin, the film’s 
protagonist, who is overcome by a vision of God—she proclaims, “I 
have seen God. He is a monster,” right before she is whisked away 
to a waiting helicopter for treatment. It is therefore safe to say that a 
study of the mystics in the secular age will be, at the very least, quite 
difficult, and asking about what constitutes a mystical experience may 
seem like a chimeric pursuit.
But one has to ask: is there really a concept of the mystical, much 
less mystical experience? Grace Jantzen notes that the Christian West 
has understood the mystical “in a variety of times and places” and 
that the notion of the mystical as an entirely subjective and absolutely 
private experience only flourished in modernity, where it eventually 
established itself as the paradigm in understanding what exactly 
constitutes “the mystical.”34 She further notes that the very concept 
33Jean-Luc Marion, “Introduction: What Do We Mean by ‘Mystic’?,” in 
Michael Kessler & Christian Sheppard, eds., Mystics: Presence and Aporia, trans. 
Gareth Gollrad (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1.
34Grace M. Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Mysticism (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 323. It must be noted here that Jantzen seeks to sketch a genealogy 
58 Chua
of “mystical experience” only entered the grammar of religion in 
modernity, when the power and the cosmological hegemony of the 
Church were diffused and reconfigured according to the secular state.35 
If one were to investigate the “mystical,” one cannot confine oneself 
to an investigation of the mere phenomenality of experience because 
one cannot but run up to one’s own discursive construction of what 
counts as mystical experience. Here Marion, in his attempt at sketching 
the limits of objective phenomenality and the possibility of opening up 
to what he calls “the saturated phenomenon,” will rightfully agree: 
Saturated phenomena should not be constituted at all, and what we 
experience with them is precisely an intuition overwhelming any 
possible concept. This is not because the saturated phenomenon is 
irrational, but because we are unable to be rational enough to produce 
concepts matching the intuition that is nevertheless in fact given.36
We can therefore say that “mystical experience” exists, but not in the 
modern sense of “experience,” that is to say, experience of the object 
corresponding to the intuition.
There is, however, one more location—a discursive site, if you 
will—in which “mystics” can be investigated without sacrificing 
of mysticism within the question of gendered power. It is striking, nonetheless, 
how Jantzen, even before Asad and Taylor, anticipates the discursivity of 
religious concepts in modernity, and how such constructions influence how 
we generally understand religion not only as a concept unto itself but also in 
relation to the secular. For instance, she notes that:
It was only with the development of the secular state, when religious 
experience was no longer perceived as a source of knowledge and 
power, that it became safe to allow women to be mystics. Thus it 
came about that when mysticism became constructed as private and 
personal, having nothing to do with politics, it was also possible to 
see it as compatible with a woman’s role as the “angel of the house,” 
servicing her husband and children not only physically but spiritually 
as well. ( Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Mysticism, 326)
35Jantzen, Power, Gender, and Mysticism, 326.
36Marion, “Introduction,” 5.
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the rigor of analysis to mere fantasy formations: the textualities of 
mystic literature. In his The Mystic Fable, Michel de Certeau outlines this 
historiography of the mystics:
The mystic groups and books nevertheless constitute a specific 
historical reality. Although, from that point of view, they appear in 
the formal guise of absence—a past—they are amenable to an analysis 
that sets them within a multiplicity of correlations among economic, 
social, cultural, epistemological, and other data. To establish these 
coherences (correlation is the instrument of the historian) is to preserve 
the difference of the past from the seduction of partial resemblances, 
from generalizations suggested by philosophical impatience, or from 
continuities postulated by genealogical piety. … It comes from many a 
sojourn in these remote corners of the past that reveal to the historian 
the infinitude of a local singularity.37
The inevitable reduction of history to text bears an inherent danger of 
treating historical events and actors as mere objects of study: “What 
gets called ‘history’ (a school subject, a professional practice, a type of 
television programme, and so on) consists of ordering and commenting 
on documents.”38 This tendency in historiography establishes the space 
of power of the surveyor, who looks at her objects of study. The text 
then becomes a formalist narrative unity that is enclosed upon itself; 
language is idealized as an object of study, and it serves as a mere tool in 
trying to “understand” the meaning of a historical event.39 De Certeau 
points to this new historiography precisely to look at the subjects or 
37Michel de Certeau, The Mystic Fable: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, trans. 
Michael B. Smith (Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 9.
38Ben Highmore, Michel de Certeau: Analysing Culture (London: Continuum, 
2006), 23.
39What is apparent here is that the very neutrality and surveyability of the 
space of the Expert is itself a construction of the modern conception of 
objectivity. De Certeau makes a more forceful diagnosis in Culture in the Plural: 
“The anonymous universalism of the city, of culture, of work, or of knowledge 
develops the impossibility of being situated as different and of reintroducing 
alterity—hence conflict—into language” (Culture in the Plural, ed. & intro. Luce 
Giard, trans. & afterword by Tom Conley [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997], 33).
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actors that are implicated in the linguistic tactics of the text. In other 
words, de Certeau looks at how the text is made possible (and therefore 
only possible) within a nexus of institutional networks that allow for 
an actor—in our case, the mystic—to practice the writing of the text 
without reducing it to a representational space of objective study.40 He 
wants to refocus the study of history away from the point of view of 
the expert, and into the practical space of discourse in which writing 
is first and foremost considered as a practice: “[mystic language] is the 
effect of an elaboration upon existent language …. The uses that define 
it reflect the operations carried out by speakers.”41
De Certeau begins his analysis of the mystics: “Sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century mystics proliferated about a loss. It is the historical 
figure of that loss, making readable an absence that has multiplied 
the productions of desire.”42 Paradoxically, rather than revealing the 
corridors of power that allow for the proliferation of what is generally 
40Highmore, Michel de Certeau: Analysing Culture, 33. Furthermore, this “writing 
of history” is, for de Certeau, always situated in an economy of institutional 
power and influence that provides the space for permissible and impermissible 
actions, where the agent (de Certeau will later call him the everyman) navigates 
and negotiates through these spaces. His method, therefore, aims to show 
how the possibility of knowledge is also a production of knowledge. Thus, in The 
Writing of History, de Certeau says: “Only a theory that articulates a practice can 
be accepted, that is, a theory which on the one hand opens the practices to a 
space of a society, while on the other it organizes the procedures belonging to 
a given discipline” (Michel de Certeau, “The Historiographical Operation,” 
in The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley [New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1988], 57). It is in this sense that the text—that is to say, the operations of 
language in a text—becomes a site for a historiography of the mystics precisely 
because it is these texts that we encounter, and this encounter could not have 
been possible without these negotiations within institutional and historical 
spaces. As Highmore says, “When historiography embraces this aspect of 
production, the changing history of an event, the mutability of its meaning, 
can become the object of reflection” (Highmore, Michel de Certeau: Analysing 
Culture, 35).
41De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 141–142.
42De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 13.
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referred to as mystic literature, what characterizes this historical period 
in terms of religious discourse and mystic writing is the ambiguity of 
the institutional structure of the Church:
It reiterates at the level of biographical experience all the vocabulary of 
the Church reformation: division, wounds, sickness, lying, desolations, 
and so on. Individual bodies tell the story of the institutions of meaning. 
The end of a world is postulated in all of the spiritual poetics. Their 
bright and daring trajectories streak the night sky, from which they have 
been removed by pious collectors of mystic traces. They are written on 
that blank page from which we must relearn to read them.43
The theological44 grammar that constitutes the space for permissible 
and impermissible discourses in Christendom undergoes a drastic 
shift at the dawn of modernity, and for de Certeau, he takes up the 
specific timeframe of the 16th–17th centuries as a reference point for 
this shift:
Learned clerics were being separated from the common folk, 
and administrative power was becoming more highly organized 
and centralized. As theology became more professionalized and 
international, its knowledge became more technical. The divisions 
between different ecclesiastical levels of authority were politicized, 
and secular law was becoming autonomous. Rural culture and 
rural “devotions” were increasingly isolated from the emerging 
urban bourgeoisie.45
These shifts in the social order bespeak of a change in social relations: 
from the corpus mysticum that defined much of pre-modern discourses on 
the legitimization of institutional practices, most especially Eucharistic 
43De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 14.
44I use this term liberally, as it is also clear how the word theology can lend 
itself to meanings that may not have made sense to these authors. For instance, 
Marion notes that there was, strictly speaking, no concept of theology before 
the advent of modernity (or, for Marion, the Suarezian systematization of 
metaphysics); there was only vera philosophia, where verus philosophus est amator 
Dei. See Jean-Luc Marion, “On the Foundation of the Distinction Between 
Theology and Philosophy,” Budhi 1 & 2 & 3 (2009): 52.
45De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 85.
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and liturgical practices in which the body is the site of an absence 
( Jesus Christ), the “mystical body” now becomes the hierarchical 
institution of the physical Church, a stand-in for the absence of the 
body that legitimizes the discourse of what counts as religious.46 This 
change in perspective in the final analysis reorders the productions 
of knowledge, which in turn establish the range of permissible 
and impermissible interpretations of religious practices; divergent 
discourses are institutionalized and marginalized according to the 
relations of power that serve as their condition of possibility. Only in 
this context could the mystics have arisen, and it is only at the turn of 
modernity that we can understand “mystics” as the place of a loss.
For the purposes of this essay, we can point out two general—
though not entirely representative—themes that we find in mystic 
literature that point to its context and possibility: the themes of exile 
and excess. It is this dual-hermeneutic of expulsion and saturation 
that can serve as a schema for the analysis of the practical space of 
mystic speech.
The term “mystics”—at least in the 16th century onwards47—came 
to refer to groups of people, even if indeterminately, who were without 
a place or, better yet, who lacked a place: “The noun ‘mystic’ seems to 
have made its appearance within and in reference to groups that were 
furthest removed from the theological institution; like many proper 
nouns, it first took the form of a nickname or accusatory term.”48 
From the ecclesiastical point of view, the mystics came to be known as 
46De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 81–82. De Certeau makes a further case that the 
bifurcation of Church and Scripture and their respective co-constituencies 
with the Sacramental Body allows for the mystical “third term” to serve as the 
space for the manifestation of both ecclesiastical and Scriptural economies in 
the mystical body. See de Certeau, Mystic Fable, 85.
47The specificities of the history of how “mystics” came to be understood are 
too complex and drawn out to be mentioned in this paper. De Certeau himself 
undertakes this task; see his Mystic Fable, 79–112.
48De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 107.
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“moderns,”49 those who inaugurated a “new” form of discourse. Even 
from the Reformation movement, Martin Luther himself discredited 
mystical practices as being symptomatic of the hierarchical and 
sacramental (i.e., symbolic) valuation of Christianity.50 It is therefore 
safe to say that the mystics were a marginalized group within the 
socio-political shifts of power within the Church and the saeculum. This 
marginalization comes at a time of socio-cultural change: for instance, 
the rise of the German mystics such as Angelus Silesius also coincided 
with the rise of the urban bourgeoisie, depriving the former of a 
privileged position in Church matters, which for de Certeau “allowed 
for greater independence from religious authorities.”51 Apart from 
the shifts in social classes, the High Middle Ages were characterized 
by three major linguistic mobilizations: 1) the formalization and the 
technicalization of Latin (most apparent in the institutionalization of 
Latin in universities); 2) the rise and spread of the use of vernacular 
languages,52 making bilingualism a linguistic trait of that era; and, 
49De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 109. He quotes Marais and Boileau as speaking of 
the mystics as moderns who “are not found in the ancients.”
50De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 95. Fanning also notes that mystical practices 
within the Reformation movement “stiffened the Protestant mistrust of such 
phenomena” (Steven Fanning, Mystics of the Christian Tradition [New York: 
Routledge, 2001], 139).
51De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 85. This, of course, was accentuated by the 
fact that the Inquisition was at its height.
52This was accentuated by the increasing usage of the printing press, making 
the dissemination of their works easier and more convenient. Both de Certeau 
and Fanning point to Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros as helping in 
the proliferation of mystic literature during the 16th century. This, of course, 
also helped spread the idea that mysticism is for everyone and not just the 
educated elite. This goes to show how the factors underlying the productions 
of knowledge influence not only value assignments to objects but also the idea 
of what is implicated as “right” for a human person in that particular economy. 
See Fanning, Mystics, 149.
64 Chua
most importantly, 3) the increasing mobility of texts via translations.53 
It is then of no surprise that mystic literature abounded on the 
frontiers not only in terms of socio-economic classes but also in 
terms of geographical location, where encounters with other cultural 
traditions were commonplace.54 This rapid mobility of the productions 
of knowledge and the fragmentation of one’s identification with one’s 
“natural” or “home” language set up the possibility of a “new” mode 
of discourse—what de Certeau calls “ways of speaking”—that would 
characterize mystic speech. It is a way of speaking that does not find its 
home, denied by the institutional power on the one hand and forged 
and explored in a foreign land on the other.
This excursive discourse reveals the space that allows us to see not 
only the context but also the internal struggles of these mystics 
who were excluded by the institutional power that disallowed for 
the legitimacy of their discourse. Thus, we also see a diversification 
of the modes for articulating this exile, for various modalities of 
literary genres and styles also populated mystic literature. Examples 
of these are the autobiographical style of Teresa de Avila, “fictional 
itineraries,” and “points for reflection” or rules, such as the Spiritual 
Exercises of Ignacio de Loyola, among others.55 These narrative styles 
53De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 116. De Certeau specifically cites Henri de Herp’s 
Spieghel der Volcomenheit, first published in 1477, and its subsequent translations 
in different vulgar languages as examples of this high rate of textual mobility. 
This did not only allow for the rapid dissemination of the work; it also created 
hermeneutic spaces where distinctive discursive practices could abound.
54De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 85. Both de Certeau and Brague note the 
significance of the “new Christians” movement (converted Jews) in Spain 
during the sixteenth century, and how these movements of conversion also 
influenced the productions of knowledge—in our case, mystic literature and, 
for Brague, the intermingling of people who belonged to different religions 
( Judaism) which allowed for its dissemination in the Christian world. See 
Rémi Brague, The Legend of the Middle Ages: Philosophical Explorations of Medieval 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009), 22.
55De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 120.
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speak not only of their exile from the foundations of meaning—the 
hierarchical Christian Church—but also of their act of solidarity with 
the gradual disintegration of the Christian hegemonic order.56 This 
seemingly paradoxical situation also gives birth to mystic utterance: the 
founding of a language that could articulate the “language of God” 
within the fragmentation of society and language into its vulgarities. 
The mystical subject is thrust in medias res, between the acceptance of 
the irreparability of things past and, at the same time, the possibility 
for an articulation of a renewal of faith in the midst of the gradual 
withering away of the institutions of meaning. In one of de Certeau’s 
celebrated studies, he focuses on a Jesuit mystic named Jean-Joseph 
Surin in order to elaborate this characteristic in mystic writing. He 
quotes Surin from his Lettres:
This image will seem like only a hollow thought to others, like a dream 
my mind made up, because the natural, common sense upon which 
our faith is built bolsters us to such a degree against these things of the 
other life that, as soon as a man says he is damned, the others judge 
that it is only madness.57
The mystics were deeply aware of the changing circumstances of their 
times, and their search for God led them to articulate their own spiritual 
poverty and to confront and dwell in their own decadence.58
But it is in this search for God in the midst of loss that they are 
founded by an experience of the Divine. One can discern the theme 
of excess being co-constitutive with the experience of exile latent in 
mystical texts. For instance, Teresa de Avila would often speak of “a 
feeling of the presence of God [that] made it impossible for me to doubt 
that he was within me, or that I was totally engulfed in Him. This was 
56De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 86.
57Michel de Certeau, “Surin’s Melancholy,” in Heterologies: Discourse on the 
Other, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), 102.
58De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 86.
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no kind of vision.”59 An encounter occurs in mystical utterance: the 
mystical subject in the midst of the disintegration of the institutions 
of meaning on the one hand, an Other that irrupts in the scene on the 
other. Here a dialogue is sought after: “The rupture, ambiguity, and 
falsity that plurality spreads throughout the world creates the need to 
restore a dialogue.”60 One never engages in mystic speech by oneself, 
as with soliloquy; one is always at the behest of an Other that (always) 
overdetermines one’s speaking. Thus, de Certeau would speak of 
mystic literature as “not written” because “it writes itself,”61 although 
by saying that he is not reverting back to an esoteric mode of utterance. 
Bearing in mind what we have so far discussed, we can see that this 
auto-biography (self-writing) is itself a production of the context of 
their time, in the search for this Other that in the end allows for their 
speaking. Ultimately for him, 
the I is both figurative and a figure, a symbolic representation. The 
figure, the third and last element to be discussed, is not utterative, 
except disguised as an image. It is, rather, an organizing factor. It 
marks in the text the empty place (empty of world) where the other 
speaks, following a process the discourse describes by recounting its 
own production.62
The I, therefore, becomes the site where the Other irrupts. But what 
defines this irruption?
A characteristic element in mystic writing is the overdetermination 
of meaning, an excess of intuition. We have already noted earlier with 
Marion that it is this “saturated phenomenon” that may characterize 
the mystical experience. We also find this inscribed in mystic literature. 
For instance, we see in John of the Cross how the “dark night of the 
soul” eventually comes up to
59Teresa of Avila, The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself, trans. J. M. Cohen 
(London: Penguin, 1957), 71.
60De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 88.
61De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 97.
62De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 94.
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the enkindling of spiritual love in the soul, which, in the midst of 
these dark confines, feels itself to be keenly and sharply wounded in 
strong Divine love, and to have a certain realization and foretaste of 
God, although it understands nothing definitely, for, as we say, the 
understanding is in darkness.63
Images of darkness and supra-essential light, taking inspiration from 
Dionysius the Areopagite, populate mystical literature, locating a 
place “beyond my homeland” that is unnamable. And it is precisely 
this encounter with the Divine that takes up the I: it is not merely 
one who speaks, but God. We can borrow from Meister Eckhart 
in the 14th century and speak of this as the “birth of God within 
oneself”—theogenesis—that best characterizes this overdetermination 
of meaning.64 Once again, it is in mystic textual practices that we are 
allowed to posit this “new beginning”:
Mystics are engaged in a politics of utterance …. This kind of “politics,” 
like contemporary rhetoric, sets forth operational rules determining 
the relational usage of a language that has become uncertain of the 
real. It reconstructs, where the ontological relation between words and 
things has come undone, loci of social communication.65
The overdeterminations of meaning, apart from their autobiographical 
comportment, also serve as tactics that attempt to articulate a new 
beginning within the decadence of the Church. This “new beginning” 
is not at all an initiative of the agent: “The ‘I’ is ‘formed’—by its act 
of willing nothing or by (forever) being incapable of doing what it 
wills—as a ‘desire’ bound only to the supposed desire of a Deity.”66 It 
is then of no surprise that a transformation occurs at the moment of 
encounter—“mystical union”—where the I is taken up by its dialogue 
63John of the Cross, Dark Night of the Soul, trans., ed., & intro. E. Allison Pears 
(New York: Doubleday, 2005), 141.
64Reiner Schürmann, Wandering Joy: Meister Eckhart’s Mystical Philosophy, trans. & 
comm. Reiner Schürmann, foreword by David Appelbaum (Great Barrington: 
Lindisfarne Books, 2001), 73.
65De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 91.
66De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 92.
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partner, who is none other than God: “With his gentle hand he 
wounded my neck and caused all / my senses to be suspended.”67 The 
usage of the I in mystic utterance does not only refer to the mystical 
subject taken up by God; it refers to nothing else but God himself. 
The identification of God with the I is also itself a veil: one can never 
know of the face of God.68 This establishes the clear continuity with 
tradition—“No one has seen God” (Jn. 1:18)—while at the same time 
subverting it through the textual tactics of mystic writing: “I remained, 
lost in oblivion; My face I reclined on the Beloved.”69
In the final analysis, these descriptions of excess and exile 
“articulated the experience of an elsewhere, but within the tradition 
they adopted.”70 The mystics had to show their communion with the 
Church of God while at the same time distinguishing themselves from 
the decadence of the time. It is here that we are shown the ingenuity 
of mystic literature—the practice of subversion through writing or, in 
de Certeau’s words, “the power to induce a departure.”
With this excursus regarding mystic utterance and tactics, we are 
now in a position to return to our main question: how can mystical 
discourse and its textual inscriptions provide us with a mode of 
dwelling in the so-called secular age?
67John of the Cross, Dark Night, 30.
68As Marion notes, “he remains God only on condition that this ignorance 
be established and admitted definitively” ( Jean-Luc Marion, “In the Name: 
How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’,” in John D. Caputo & 
Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky 
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999], 34).
69John of the Cross, Dark Night, 30. De Certeau also notes that the mystics 
relied heavily on Sacred Scripture, showing how these groups were still operating 
within the tradition of the Church. See de Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 98.
70De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 22.
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iv. The irruptions of the Mystical in the  
Secular Waste land
What can we learn from the mystics of the 16th and 17th centuries? 
To be sure, the social and material conditions that gave rise to mystic 
literature were profoundly different from our own context and time. 
One should likewise be suspicious of the apparent continuity in 
discourse from their time to our time, as if the same movements in 
power and knowledge will also result in the same eventualities, and as 
if there are more or less the same phenomena that constitute both our 
age and theirs. As Foucault reminds us, this does not of course preclude 
the fact that there may be similarities in terms of the conditions that 
allow for the social shifts to occur. What we have to be mindful of, 
however, is that these shifts “are always the result of a construction the 
rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be 
scrutinized.”71 Nevertheless, we already find within mystic literature 
the possibility of “learning from them.” For de Certeau, “[mystic 
utterance] says nothing. It permits saying. For that reason, it is a true 
‘beginning.’ It is a liberating space, where yesterday’s readers—but 
‘we’ also—can find speech.”72 The hermeneutic key that allows for 
our appropriation—despite the clear and irreconcilable gulf which 
history sets up between those mystics and us—is their very inclusion 
within tradition through language, which is none other than the articulation 
of the personal encounter with God that lies at the heart of Christian 
revelation—an encounter with a person. The vocative “we” that 
mystics use is meant not only for their immediate listeners; it is also 
directed to the members of the ecclesia, the people of God. Thus, de 
Certeau quotes Surin in the prologue of La Science Experimentale:
It is in the same spirit and with the same intent that these things that 
we have known through an adventure we have had during our century, 
and in which God’s providence engaged us, are used in this discourse 
71Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. 
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 25.
72De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 99.
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to affirm the faith we are engaged to profess by the Catholic religion, 
and to make us better Christians. All those to whom we speak in this 
book have an interest in these things. For them I would like to perform 
a service for eternity.73
Here it is not Surin that speaks of this eternal performativity but the 
Eternal Word. The textual tactics of the double-reference of the I 
allow for this plurification and multiplication of the same discursive 
practice. This is not to say that the discursive tactic transforms mystic 
utterance into a universilizable discourse; on the contrary, it can only be 
understood within its proper context, and we have shown this above. 
That is to say, mystic utterance can only be understood in the context of a 
loss, and it is in this loss that an eternity can be performed: an indwelling 
in the “ceaseless present” made possible by the irruption of the Other 
which forever eludes one’s calculation and rationalization.
And do we not have this in our secular age, when the plurification 
of the idea of human flourishing produces endless avenues for human 
agency to capitalize on? Against this anthropocentric tendency, a path 
is paved by mystic utterance, for it is only with the Other that one can 
“begin anew” by ceaselessly dwelling in one’s time, despite the gradual 
dissolution of the institutions of meaning:
One more thing, perhaps, is mystical: the establishment of a space 
where change serves as a foundation and saying loss is an other 
beginning. Because it is always less than what comes through it and 
allows a genesis, the mystic [poem] is connected to the nothing that 
opens the future, the time to come, and, more precisely, to that single 
work, “Yahweh,” which forever makes possible the self-naming of that 
which induces departure.74
Mystic writing, in the final analysis, bears the weight of a broken 
tradition while at the same time maintaining a hope “to the Other” 
which makes “everything new” (Rev. 21:5). The fragmentation of 
society must not be taken as a negative moment, as the mystics 
73De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 180.
74De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 100.
71Travelling in the Secular Waste Land
considered their time to be positive spaces for the irruption of the 
Divine:
Blast the marginalized fragments of the past alive with the memory 
of suffering and hope; remove them from their seemingly coherent 
place in the grand narratives we have imposed upon them. Learn to 
live joyfully, not despairingly, with and in the great fragments we do 
indeed possess.75
With these “mystic signposts,” we then ask: what is to be done in 
the waste land of the secular age? As long as we understand “doing” in 
terms of the robust human agent capable of being the author of his or 
her own actions, we are reverting back to the illusion of totalization and 
control, the grand narrativization of the totality of experience. Against 
this totalizing tendency one says with the mystics: to “live without a 
why.” Meister Eckhart, as we have seen earlier, animates most of the 
subsequent mystic literature76 precisely with this point: 
All things that are in time have a why. Thus when someone asks a man: 
“Why are you eating?”—“In order to gain strength.”—“Why are you 
sleeping?”—“For the same reason.” And so everything that is in time. 
But if someone asked a good man: “Why do you love God?”—“I do 
not know, because of God.” …“Why are you living?”—“My word, I 
do not know! But I am happy to be alive.”77
We can then read mystic literature against the backdrop of our time 
as a mode of subversion in our own attempts at totalizing from the 
75David Tracy, “Fragments: The Spiritual Situation of our Times,” in John D. 
Caputo & Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), 179.
76I qualify with “most” since some mystics, specifically the Spanish mystics of 
the 16th century, did not have any access to Eckhart’s works, and it is only towards 
the end of the 16th century that Eckhart’s sermons were spread throughout the 
Iberian peninsula. Nevertheless, it is equally striking how Eckhart and St. John, 
among others, share similar forms of mystical language.
77Meister Eckhart, “Woman, the Hour is Coming,” in Wandering Joy: Meister 
Eckhart’s Mystical Philosophy, trans. & comm. Reiner Schürmann, foreword by 
David Appelbaum (Great Barrington: Lindisfarne Books, 2001), 54.
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standpoint of the robust human agent. Mystic utterance teaches us of 
the eventual failure of teleology in trying to achieve the “full human 
life” because it is only with and through the Other that one is taken 
up to the “mystical island.” 
While Taylor’s model allows for plurality to abound from the 
point of view of the morally-constituted agent, the mystics teach 
us that human flourishing does not lie in the agency of the human 
person amidst the choices that are presented to him/her. Far from 
being a teleocratic principle of fullness78 where the immanent is fully 
reconciled with the transcendent, the mystics clear out a space where 
the transcendent does not cease to irrupt. It is in this never-ending 
process of purgation and breakthrough—and here we see traces of 
the Dionysian mystical process—that a new beginning can finally 
be mapped out: not for the sake of some utopic future, but always a 
“kingdom that is here, but not yet.” To be sure, one cannot just reject 
Taylor’s sketch of the secular age, for it does hold some credence. What 
is essential here, however, is the genesis of the moment of choice that 
characterizes the varieties of human flourishing: the “condition of 
the possibility” of choice no longer lies in the agent. It is rather, as 
the prophets of Israel tell us, to be “called” and chosen in the midst 
of the world. The critical moment, then, is to choose to dwell in the 
decadence of our time, as the mystics did, for it is only in this dwelling 
that the heterological possibilities produce endless narrativity. It is not a 
matter of choosing what fits best for one’s aspirations and desires, as is 
suggested by the pluralities of human flourishing; it is, rather, a matter 
of choosing to “let be”—what Eckhart has called Gelassenheit—and 
let the Other take up oneself. To assent to mystical utterance and to 
“follow them,” in the final analysis, is to be led beyond the limits of 
technological and rational phenomenality, and onto the possibility 
of being founded upon by the Other: “the modern system of the 
calculating, technological subject opens a space that ultimately eludes 
78Here we still discern traces of Taylor’s Hegelianism in his attempt to reconcile 
plurality to form a totality.
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the subject’s planning and calculation because it eludes the subject’s 
power and representation.”79
v. conclusion
We provided a response to Taylor’s challenge to enlarge our palettes 
for the transcendent by taking inspiration from the mystic writing 
of the 16th and 17th centuries. With the aid of de Certeau’s discursive 
analysis, we pointed out two elements in mystic utterance—excess 
and exile—that showed both 1) their context of loss and degradation 
but also 2) an establishment of a space where an encounter with the 
Divine reorders the economies of knowledge and faith. The subversive 
techniques of mystic utterance open up their discourse to endless 
narrativity, which in turn allows us to understand mystic utterance 
in our context. We ended with the possibility of opening up to an 
“Other” discourse as a possible path which the mystics clear out for 
us in our secular age.
The contemporary times can thus be said to be a critical moment 
in the history of thought not only in terms of how important it is to 
respond to our present predicament but, more importantly, in terms 
of being a space for choice that may lie outside the purview of human 
agency. We can thus end this essay most fittingly with David Tracy: 
It is crucial, I believe, that the two forms of awareness represented 
in secular thought by philosophy and tragedy are also present in 
Western religious thought. On the one hand, one finds a meditative 
and contemplative awareness that, when intensified, is well described 
as mystical. … On the other hand, one finds a prophetic awareness 
focused on evil injustice and suffering that, when intensified, becomes 
apocalyptic: when prophesy fails, apocalyptic takes over.80
79Thomas A. Carlson, “Locating the Mystical Subject,” in Michael Kessler 
& Christian Sheppard, eds., Mystics: Presence and Aporia, trans. Gareth Gollrad 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 225.
80David Tracy, “Afterword: A Reflection on Mystics: Presence and Aporia,” 
in Michael Kessler & Christian Sheppard, eds., Mystics: Presence and Aporia, trans. 
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